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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. G. YANKOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. S.V. PURUSHOTTAM
Mr. B. AHMED

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I declare open the two hundred and twenty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): It is a matter of considerable gratification to the Indian delegation that our Committee has reconvened this summer after a long recess. All of us are convinced of the earnest desire of the peace-loving peoples of the world for the continuance of patient but purposeful negotiations on the issues of disarmament, and we are happy to have once again resumed our negotiations in this Committee. Personally, I am also proud of the privilege of joining my colleagues on the Committee after a long absence.

In this context the Indian delegation would like to place on record its appreciation of the agreement of the two co-Chairmen, representing the United States and the Soviet Union, to reconvene the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We have always believed that all of us, countries large and small, have a significant role to play in humanity's quest for peace and security. At the same time we are aware that international progress in that direction depends in large measure on the co-operative efforts of the leaders of those two great and powerful countries. This is particularly valid with regard to the issues that we negotiate in this Committee. The two super-Powers have at their disposal an awesome panoply of destructive power, and it is to them primarily that the nations of the world look to bring the world back to the path of stability and sanity. It is therefore a matter of great satisfaction to us that, thanks to the agreement between the co-Chairmen, we are once again engaged in the most urgent and vital task facing humanity today: namely, negotiations on the issues of disarmament as well as the reduction of tensions and the building of mutual confidence.

It was in that spirit that we welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union to convene the Disarmament Commission in April of this year. That initiative led to a fruitful and constructive debate on the basic problems arising in any consideration of disarmament, and eventually the Commission was able to adopt two resolutions (DC/224 and 225, ENDC/149) with overwhelming majorities. Those two resolutions represent the combined will and the common aspirations of the international community as a whole. The deliberations of the Disarmament Commission, which lasted for nearly two months, had a message which is aptly contained in them. It is therefore

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necessary to devote some attention to those resolutions, which received the massive support of the membership of the United Nations. As it happened, both were tabled by large groups of non-aligned delegations, and we of the Indian delegation were highly gratified at the part we were privileged to play in their success.

The first of them dealt with the convening of a world disarmament conference. Following the proposal made by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964 (A/5736, pp. 23, 24), it recommended the General Assembly of the United Nations to give urgent consideration to that proposal. We have no doubt that the General Assembly will devote its full attention to that recommendation and examine the various issues related to the successful holding of a fruitful conference.

References have been made to this resolution in our debate and I think it is useful to clarify some of its aspects. As we all know, the international community had devoted attention to questions of disarmament long before the United Nations came into existence. Again, the very first resolution of the United Nations related to an aspect of disarmament. Recently, however, and particularly since the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, these issues have been debated, studied and negotiated more exhaustively and comprehensively than ever before.

International consideration of the problems of disarmament has all along followed two courses. First, as disarmament is a matter of vital concern to the whole of mankind and reflects the hopes and aspirations of all peoples of the world, it has been discussed in various bodies representing the nations of the world. The Disarmament Commission, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Assembly in its plenary sessions have deliberated fruitfully, and adopted appropriate resolutions, on questions of disarmament. The representatives of the non-aligned nations who assembled first in Belgrade in September 1961 and then in Cairo in October 1964 believed it was also desirable to have another and more representative gathering to deliberate on this issue. The Disarmament Commission agreed to that recommendation, and we have no doubt that the United Nations General Assembly also will agree to it and adopt appropriate preparatory steps towards an early convocation of the proposed conference.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

I spoke of two courses or methods. The first method is that of considering questions of disarmament in deliberative bodies or ad hoc gatherings such as the Disarmament Commission, the General Assembly, regional and other conferences and the world disarmament conference. The second course is that of negotiation as distinct from deliberation. It is realized by all persons who have thought seriously about disarmament that it is not possible to negotiate details of disarmament -- either of a treaty on general and complete disarmament or of agreements on collateral measures -- in a large body, ad hoc or permanent, of 114 or 120 or so representatives meeting for comparatively short periods. Such negotiations need long, patient and technical consideration and scrutiny by a smaller group. Negotiations on disarmament have therefore been conducted in smaller committees of experts, whether consisting of five representatives or ten or seventeen. As has been generally appreciated, after a period of trial and error we have now established an appropriate body -- the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament -- to deal with the task of negotiation as distinct from the task of debate, deliberation and adoption of resolutions on broad issues of disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of the sponsors of resolution DC/224 in the Disarmament Commission, I emphasized therefore this point in some detail. In fact, this resolution of the Commission on the world disarmament conference recognized the importance of the efforts being made in the fields of both deliberation and negotiation, and emphasized that a debate in a forum such as the world disarmament conference would give powerful support to the praiseworthy efforts which were being made all the time. That, in fact, was what the Cairo Conference felt, and it was what the Disarmament Commission approved. What was needed, the Commission said, was that the process set in motion by United Nations bodies and by our Committee should be developed further. It cannot be the function of the world disarmament conference to undertake any detailed negotiations on disarmament, nor should it **equally** be the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to devote its attention to the deliberative or debating aspect of disarmament.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

I have spoken at some length on this matter as I wish to emphasize unequivocally that the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament still remains, and will continue to remain, as essential as it is urgent. The great contribution that the Cairo concept made in that respect was to support the continuing international efforts on disarmament, as fully reflected in the preamble of the Commission's resolution. The membership of the Disarmament Commission, of course, was already conscious of this two-course approach. Appropriately, therefore, it passed two resolutions, the first (DC/224) dealing with the proposal of a more representative deliberative conference, and the second (DC/225) dealing with the question of negotiations.

The second resolution is thus of direct concern to our work in this Committee. In this connexion I think it is useful to devote some attention to the relevance of the various provisions of the resolution to the question of our programme of work. It has been suggested that this second resolution requires that we devote our discussions mainly to two issues: namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. To our mind, that is not its import. In fact, its operative paragraph 2 has several sub-paragraphs, and the very first sub-paragraph clearly refers to the urgency to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament and to consider the various proposals made during the debate in the Commission. The Soviet Union and many other countries made some pertinent proposals, particularly with regard to the reduction and eventual removal of foreign troops and bases, and to a conference to consider the question of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, in fact, advanced those ideas in the form of two draft resolutions (DC/218, 219). Similarly, the United States and other countries put forward some promising ideas, including a freeze on production of certain nuclear delivery vehicles and a freeze on production and transference of fissile material to peaceful purposes. The United States also put its ideas down in the form of a draft resolution (DC/220/Rev.1).

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

What I wish to emphasize is that the Disarmament Commission certainly did not, even if it was in a position to do so, preclude discussion in our Committee on any of those subjects. That was certainly not the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution; nor was it, as I have said, the final view of the Commission. We have therefore seriously to consider these issues particularly those raised by the big Powers.

Operative sub-paragraph 2(a) of resolution DC/225 is thus of as much importance as other sub-paragraphs, and we hope that we shall be able to devote attention to the question of general and complete disarmament and to other collateral measures "to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race." (ENDC/149) I appreciate, of course, that time is the crucial factor and that we shall need to organize our programme of work bearing in mind the limited time at our disposal.

Operative sub-paragraph 2(b) referred to the question of extending the scope of the present partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground tests, and desired that this be considered as a matter of priority. To our mind and to the minds of many non-aligned delegations this is easily the most urgent and the most important task facing the Committee at this stage. We do not have much time before the General Assembly takes up items on disarmament, and we believe that this is one field in which it is possible to report at least some progress. The Commission also gave special priority to the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a programme of certain related measures. On consideration of the requirements of time, ripeness for solution, urgency and the political and disarmament value of the measure, however, we believe that it is essential for us to devote particular and primary attention to the question of reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

The Indian position on this issue is well known. We have maintained that all nuclear tests are basically evil; they encourage evil, and the sooner this evil is dealt with the better. We raised our voice against these explosions right from their unfortunate inception, and over eleven years ago we addressed an appeal to the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee on Disarmament to consider immediately the question of a "stand-still" agreement in respect of these test explosions pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

We have throughout consistently advanced this view and have particularly emphasized the deleterious genetic and somatic effects of test explosions. We said this again a couple of months ago when the People's Republic of China exploded a second nuclear weapon device in the atmosphere -- a direct and callous affront to all humanity -- even when the Disarmament Commission was actually in session. It is a sad commentary on the state of the world when a country flouts with impunity the combined will of the rest of the world and wages a blatant attack on the health of humanity.

I appreciate that we in this Committee can only express our anguish and our regret that this has happened. As a negotiating forum the Committee should look forward, and the step that we look forward to is the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or, to use the language of the Disarmament Commission resolution, extension of "the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty to cover underground tests." (DC/225; ENDC/149)

This was also the message of our Committee at the conclusion of its meeting of 5 August (ENDC/PV.221, p.24).

The Indian delegation had already formulated its views at the last session of the Committee in the memorandum appended to the Committee's report. We said:

"We consider it imperative ... that all underground tests should be discontinued immediately, either by unilateral decisions based on the policy of mutual example, or in some other appropriate way, while negotiations are going on for reconciling the differences between the nuclear Powers." (ENDC/144, p.11, Section B, sub-para.(vi)(b))

We put forward a further suggestion for the consideration of the nuclear Powers. We said (ibid, (c)) that they might enter into another partial treaty for the cessation of tests above a limited threshold and that this threshold could be lowered subsequently as a result of the exchange of scientific and other data and of appropriate negotiations. Lest there be any misunderstanding, we should like to clarify that such scientific exchanges were suggested for the specific purpose of lowering the initially-agreed threshold.

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It was nearly a year ago that we presented that memorandum. Since then there has been further technological progress in the fields of detection and identification, and if anything our conviction has grown stronger that it is desirable for the nuclear Powers to take a bold decision and, for the sake of argument, some theoretical risks in order to achieve one more significant landmark in our path of progress towards disarmament.

The nuclear Powers have taken such decisions in the past, and the peoples of the world owe a debt of gratitude to the wisdom and the vision of the leaders of those powerful and peace-loving nations. Humanity continues to hope that the big Powers will once again institute a measure like the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the prohibition on the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space (A/RES/1884(XVIII); (ENDC/117), and the reduction in production of fissile material for weapons purposes (ENDC/131, 132). These were bold decisions and theoretically there were some risks involved. We trust that the nuclear Powers will follow the same high-minded pattern and achieve a satisfactory agreement in our Committee so that the evil of underground explosions may be eliminated for ever from the earth. Delay only gives false excuses to the chauvinists among us who glorify war and to whom peaceful coexistence is a crime.

Then there was operative paragraph 2(c) of that resolution of the Disarmament Commission, which recommended that special priority be accorded also

"... to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures" (DC/225; ENDC/149).

The Indian delegation expressed its considered views on the subject in the debate in the Disarmament Commission (DC/PV.75, pp. 4-5 et seq. of the provisional text). Although there were variations in emphasis or detail, these views received the support of a large number of speakers. They were in agreement with the basic thesis that it was unrealistic to ask countries to forswear for ever a programme of nuclear weapons production when the existing nuclear Powers continued to hold on to their awesome arsenals.

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It is not only the non-aligned delegations who support this thesis. In his message to the Committee on its resumption the Secretary-General said --

"Those who have already embarked upon nuclear weapons development continue to perfect and increase their stockpile of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a growing number of States capable of nuclear weapons development will be faced with extremely grave decisions in this area which will have profound repercussions. Responsibility and restraint are needed on the part of both the nuclear and non-nuclear States. Decisions in the field of nuclear weapons development have a contagious and cumulative effect whether in the curbing or in the broadening of the nuclear arms race" (ENDC/PV.218, p.6).

Countries belonging to the two Power blocs have also appreciated the logic and rationality of this approach. In his statement at the meeting on 3 August, Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the question of elimination of already-accumulated nuclear materials, saying that "it is precisely those materials that constitute a threat." (ENDC/PV.220, p.11). A long time ago the Soviet Union put forward the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, para. 76) designed to reduce the existing nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest minimum level in the first stage of disarmament. We have had occasion to commend to this Committee the principle underlying that thesis. Philosophers tell us that it is wrong to talk of what might have been; but we venture to think that, if our suggestion had found favour at that time, the international community would not have been facing today what our friends call a prospect of nuclear anarchy.

I spoke of both the Power blocs. In the Disarmament Commission Lord Chalfont said:

"... there is an imperative need to make a start here and now down the long road we have to travel. The first priority is to halt and reverse the direction of the present uncontrolled arms race, and particularly the mounting production of these ever-costlier weapons of mass destruction. That is the central problem which poses a growing danger for all of us. It lies right at the heart of any discussion about disarmament. We believe that even now, at this moment, the order and stability of the world could be assured by a reduction of nuclear weapons to lower, safer and less costly levels."

(DC/PV.74, p.8-10 of the provisional text)

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Again, referring to the perverse and incomprehensible notion of nuclear clubs and monopolies, he said;

"Much of this, it must be said quite bluntly, is the fault of the existing nuclear Powers". (ibid., p.12)

In a recent debate in the House of Commons the United Kingdom Prime Minister referred to the draft of a non-proliferation treaty on which the United Kingdom was working and said:

"This treaty is not based on any exclusive attempt to preserve nuclear privileges for a small group of Powers."

In the July issue of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Foster contributed one of the most thought-provoking articles ever written on disarmament. One may not agree with everything that Mr. Foster has said in that article, but we note that in his excellent survey of the situation, he said:

"In stressing that such measures as reductions in Soviet and American nuclear capabilities are important if we are to succeed in dealing with nuclear proliferation, it should be made clear that it is not a question of our setting a good example, a factor of regrettably little influence in international affairs, but rather the fact that we would, by negotiating such measures, be giving evidence of our determination to reverse the arms race and move towards a world order in which the role of nuclear weapons would be diminished. Lacking at least reasonable prospects of movement in this direction, it is hard to see how, in the long run, we can hope to put any limits on the membership in the nuclear club". (July 1965, Vol. 43, No.4, p.598)

The Foreign Minister of Italy spoke to us only a few days ago and suggested that a thorough consideration be given by the Committee to the idea of a "commitment by the nuclear countries to a certain programme of nuclear disarmament" (ENDC/PV.219, p.18) in the context of an agreement on non-proliferation.

I do not wish to burden the Committee with more quotations. The non-aligned delegations have indeed spoken on many occasions on this central theme: the unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-nuclear countries, while the nuclear Powers continue to hold on to their privileged status or club membership by retaining and even increasing their deadly stockpiles. The Heads of State or Government who

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assembled in Cairo in October 1964 particularly asked the nuclear Powers to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. They said that it was as part of these efforts that the non-nuclear countries would declare their readiness not to produce or to acquire these weapons (A/5763, p.22).

Here we must make a clear and unambiguous distinction between the national decisions of countries on the one hand and the obligations to be assumed by them as signatories to an international instrument on the other. As the Committee is aware, India is the only country besides the four nuclear Powers which has a chemical separation plant in operation producing kilogramme quantities of plutonium. If any country wishes to embark on a nuclear weapons programme, it must have a chemical separation plant or a gaseous diffusion plant. India is the only one of the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons which has this facility. And yet our Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that India does not intend to enter the nuclear weapons race. India believes that nuclear energy must be used only for peaceful purposes. This is our national decision, a decision which we have taken on a thorough examination of relevant political, economic and strategic factors, and we are determined to stand firm on it.

An international treaty is, however, a different proposition. What we are discussing in this Committee is not the national decisions of countries but the international requirements of a rational, realistic and non-discriminatory agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What we are examining is the needs of the international community, not those of individual nations. It is in that context that we put forward our five-point integrated approach in the Disarmament Commission (DC/PV.75 p.17 of the provisional text), and it is in that context that we are dealing with that problem in this Committee.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Therefore, when we are talking of non-proliferation the fundamental problem we have to consider is that of the proliferation that has already taken place. The Oxford Dictionary defines the word "proliferate" as follows: "Reproduce itself, grow, by multiplication of elementary parts". We are talking about proliferation of nuclear weapons, not about the proliferation of a so-called closed club. The relevant paragraph of the preamble of the Disarmament Commission's resolution thus says:

"Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences" (DC/225; ENDC/149).

A non-proliferation agreement, therefore, is basically an agreement to be entered into by the nuclear Powers not to proliferate nuclear weapons. Other provisions are consequential and subsidiary. A prohibition to proliferate applies first to those who are in a position to proliferate or reproduce nuclear weapons themselves, and only secondarily to those who may subsequently be in such a position.

No international treaty can, therefore, be acceptable which issues dictates only to non-nuclear countries not to do this or that, particularly when the countries possessing nuclear weapons do not assume any prior commitments themselves. In India we have a word in our language derived from the name of an emperor who lived at the beginning of the seventeenth century. He himself was a drunkard, but he prohibited drinking in the empire and his name has for ever been associated with such unjust fiats.

We have all been talking of the desperate urgency of a non-proliferation agreement; but it appears to me that the basis of such urgency differs with different speakers. There is urgency in everything connected with disarmament; but, relatively speaking, the urgency of stopping non-nuclear countries from producing nuclear weapons in the future is so minor compared with that of stopping the existing nuclear menace. As we said in the Disarmament Commission:

"Unless the nuclear Powers and would-be nuclear Powers undertake from now on not to produce any nuclear weapons or weapons delivery vehicles and, in addition, agree to reduce their existing stockpile of nuclear weapons, there is no way of doing away with the proliferation that has already taken place or of preventing further proliferation."

(DC/PV.75, p.17 of the provisional text.)

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

In this connexion I should like to say a word on the use of the word "further" with regard to proliferation. We are unable to understand the relevance of this word in the present stage. There was no doubt a time when the use of this word had some meaning. That is no longer the position. The question that we ask is "How much further is further?". The world has gone beyond the days of two nuclear Powers, who further became three, who further became four; and now further a fifth country wants to force itself into this dangerous club. How long, then, shall we be using the word "further"? What shall we say after ten or twenty countries have thought fit to indulge in this deadly game? Shall we still use the word "further"? Or is there any sacred number or sacred date beyond which proliferation becomes further proliferation?

It is essential, therefore, that we deal with the fundamental problem of the existing proliferation. Further proliferation is in fact a consequence of existing proliferation, and unless we deal with the disease itself we can effect no cure. By ignoring the disease and trying to deal with vague symptoms and unreal lists of probable nuclear countries, we shall only make the disease more intractable.

I referred to the five-point proposal put forward by us in the Disarmament Commission (ibid.) We said that this was an integrated programme and that adoption of one or two isolated measures within that programme was not adequate. We particularly referred in this context to the question of an undertaking through the United Nations to safeguard the security of non-nuclear nations. There seems to be a feeling in some quarters that an attempt to meet this requirement in some measure or other would be adequate. As far as we are concerned, that is not a correct or complete reading of our proposal.

I do not wish at this stage to go into the credibility or otherwise of such an undertaking, nor into its difficult mechanics. All I wish to say is that this particular point is not the basic feature of our proposal. What we wished to do was to present a comprehensive proposal, and we included certain peripheral elements for the sake of comprehensiveness. Those peripheral elements have a certain moral and psychological value, but that is all. The basic feature of the proposal is, however, the one relating to -

"Tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery as well as a substantial reduction in the existing stocks".

(ibid.)

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

For a rational and acceptable treaty on non-dissemination this is the essential requirement. The others are peripheral.

At this stage it is necessary to remove a misunderstanding. We are not trying to embrace a wide field of disarmament in our approach on non-proliferation. There are scores of measures of disarmament, and we all know, particularly in this Committee, that the draft treaties on disarmament presented by the two sides cover numerous aspects of the process of achievement of a disarmed world. What we suggest -- namely, a stoppage of production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and reduction in their stockpiles --- is only a small part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and we refer to this small part in the context of non-proliferation because that is the real essence of non-proliferation.

In this context I should like to refer again to the important statement made by the Foreign Minister of Italy. He referred to the obstacles facing agreement on an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and mentioned the misgivings of non-nuclear nations about renouncing these weapons for ever without some progress in nuclear disarmament by the nuclear countries themselves. Mr. Fanfani then went on to say:

"But if it should not be possible to prepare within a reasonable time such a draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear and for the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of view, would fix a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries, particularly those close to nuclear capability, might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action." (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18, 19)

That is certainly a fine sentiment, and it deserves respect not only because it is expressed by the Foreign Minister of a great country, but also because it can perhaps be dovetailed into a satisfactory and rational arrangement.

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As we have said, the fundamental issue of non-proliferation is the halting and reversing of the existing proliferation. It is on this central theme that we have formulated our five-point programme (DC/PV.75, p.17 of the provisional text). Comments have been made that this integrated programme, though rational, is not capable of immediate implementation. We ourselves do not think that a programme of this nature is beyond the wisdom and the capacity of nations. At the same time, I appreciate that it is possible to conceive of a staggered programme of action, bearing in mind of course the integral nature of the programme as a whole.

The problem of proliferation admittedly relates to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, primarily to the former and secondarily to the latter. In view of this I wonder if it is possible to envisage a treaty or convention in two stages, the first relating to nuclear Powers and the second relating to non-nuclear Powers, the transition from the first stage to the second stage being regulated by the Fanfani appeal.

What I would therefore like to suggest for the consideration of the Committee is a programme of the following nature. The first stage of the treaty -- or call it the partial treaty like the one on nuclear tests, for example -- should incorporate provisions which are the obligations of the nuclear Powers. Under this partial treaty the nuclear Powers would first undertake, under a formula acceptable to the two Power blocs, not to pass on weapons or technology to others. Secondly, they would cease all production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and agree to begin a programme of reduction of their existing stocks. Thirdly, they might also agree to incorporate in this partial treaty the other measures suggested by us in our five-point programme, as they have a certain moral and psychological value.

That would be the first stage of the treaty, or a partial non-proliferation treaty. After this treaty had come into force and steps had been taken by the nuclear Powers to stop all production and embark on reduction of stocks, there would be the second stage of the treaty or the comprehensive treaty, which would provide for an undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. The transition between the first stage and the second stage of the treaty, or between the partial treaty and the comprehensive treaty, might be regulated by the formula suggested by Mr. Fanfani (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18, 19).

It appears to me that this may be another way of dealing with the question of non-proliferation if it is not possible to agree immediately on a comprehensive treaty based

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on our five-point proposal. The basic fact remains, however; and it is that the present unstable and dangerous state of affairs has resulted from the proliferation that has already taken place, and that an early removal of that state of affairs is what will make a comprehensive non-proliferation treaty realistic and abiding. As long as we are clear about the diagnosis of the disease it is not difficult to find appropriate remedies.

Our ultimate objective is clear. In the economic field the "have-nots" have adopted for themselves programmes of economic development so that eventually, with international co-operation, they increase their national wealth and become "haves". Conversely, in the disarmament field our objective is to achieve, in a spirit of mutual compromise and accommodation, a situation under which the "haves" reduce their war arsenals and eventually become "have-nots".

Opposition to the concept of nuclear monopoly or privileged club-membership is thus our fundamental response in any examination of a draft treaty or convention on non-proliferation. It is pertinent to note in this connexion that references are being made in various places to an extraneous matter, which has only marginal relevance to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or to that of disarmament as such. I am referring to the suggestion with regard to the institution of International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards over the peaceful nuclear activities of nations (ENDC/PV.218, p. 12). Of course the question of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes as a separate issue deserves our earnest consideration, and we have welcomed the decision of the United States Government and others to place some of their reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency control.

I am referring here only to the question of a treaty on non-proliferation, and the relevance to that question of this idea on safeguards. The Government of India has had occasion to express its views on this subject in many forums, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I made a statement in this Committee itself last year (ENDC/PV.174, pp. 19 et seq.). I do not, therefore, wish to go into this issue in any detail at this stage.

Institution of international controls on peaceful reactors and power stations is like an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing all its law-abiding citizens in custody while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roam the streets.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

I suppose one can say that this is one way of keeping the peace; but surely it is more rational to keep the law-breaking elements under restraint rather than the law-abiding citizens. Reactors engaged in peaceful pursuits, and atomic power stations of the developing countries, do not in themselves pose any threat to the security of the international society. It is the chemical separation plants and the gaseous diffusion plants which produce the fissile material used in bombs; and it is these facilities which need to be controlled in any system of controlled disarmament. If one wishes to control swords one need impose control, not on pig-iron plants, but only on factories which manufacture steel for swords. Any proposal, therefore, which contemplates international control on only the peaceful activities of reactors and power plants while leaving free the vast weapon-producing facilities of nuclear Powers -- their gaseous diffusion plants -- does not attempt to tackle the real problem.

Here again I must emphasize that I am referring to international treaties and conventions as distinct from national decisions. We in India, for example, have with our friends who have assisted us in the past perfectly satisfactory arrangements for safeguards, and we are determined to observe and implement them. But that is entirely different from entering into an international instrument providing for International Atomic Energy Agency or other international safeguards over the reactors and power stations of the developing countries.

Before I end I should like to refer to operative paragraph 2(d) of the Disarmament Commission's second resolution (DC/225, ENDC/149). All that this recommended was that we should keep in mind the principle of converting to a programme of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditure. The Committee was not asked to negotiate on this matter. It was only a kind of background which we had to keep in mind in our negotiations on actual measures of disarmament and reduction of tensions.

In his statement before the Disarmament Commission (DC/PV.74, pp. 6 et seq.), Lord Chalfont spoke of the philosophy of the British Government on the close link between defence and disarmament, and of the need of its defence policy to contain within itself the seeds of future progress towards disarmament. Similarly there is a link between disarmament and the availability of capital and technological resources for the development of developing countries. All that the resolution says, therefore, is that we should bear this link in mind when we talk of disarmament and negotiate measures of disarmament.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

I mention that at this stage because it has some relevance to the question of safeguards on atomic reactors. In the developing countries these reactors are instruments of economic development, and we should give careful thought before considering any proposal which, without achieving anything really worthwhile in the field of genuine disarmament, only hinders the economic development of developing countries.

I should like to conclude with the stirring appeal made by His Holiness the Pope only last Sunday, 8 August. He denounced nuclear weapons as "disastrous and dishonourable weapons" and said:

"We pray that all shall ban the awful technique which creates these weapons, multiplies and stores them for the terror of mankind, and we pray that such death-dealing weapons have not killed world peace even in attempting to achieve it, nor impaired for ever the honour of science nor extinguished the serenity of life on earth".

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I should like to take a few minutes of the Committee's time to make one more plea for a sense of urgency and of priority in dealing with those matters that are the proper concern of this Committee: that is to say, the problems of disarmament. It seems inappropriate that I should do so immediately after the thoughtful and constructive remarks of the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi. I need hardly say that I should find it hard to agree entirely with his very interesting analysis of the dangers of the further spread of nuclear weapons, or with his plan for dealing with that problem; but I shall hope to have more to say about that later. In any case, in my view, the speech is in the best tradition of the contributions of non-aligned countries to the disarmament debate. But, I regret, our deliberations have not always been marked by such a sober realization of where the real issues of disarmament lie. This Committee has as its prime responsibility the resolution of one of the most complicated problems of the cold war: namely the arms race, and the increasing danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. But, instead of addressing itself to its own task, instead of doing what it can to reduce the tensions of the cold war, it has been largely engaged in conducting a cold war of its own since it met on 27 July.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

When I came here to take part for the first time in the deliberations of this Committee, I came with one aim -- the aim of entering into serious, detailed and informed negotiations about the problems of disarmament. I came with the resolution (DC/225; ENDC/149) adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York clearly written in my mind. We had been given a clear and unequivocal mandate to reassemble here and to give our urgent consideration not only to general and complete disarmament but also to two aspects of the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. My Government, together with the other Western Governments represented here, has given much thought to formulating a draft treaty which would form a basis for negotiations about these problems. In making their opening contributions to the discussions here, the Western delegations engaged in no polemical attacks upon the policies and attitudes of the communist Powers. They concentrated constructively, and, it now appears, perhaps optimistically, on the affairs which had seemed to give the greatest concern to the 114 representatives of the countries of the world collected around the table in New York earlier this year.

Surely we can agree here -- as the representatives at the United Nations Disarmament Commission so overwhelmingly agreed -- that, while we must still of course keep our eyes firmly on the target of general and complete disarmament, other measures do offer a way of reducing international tension and creating a climate in which some of our most pressing political problems have a greater chance of being solved. And even if, as now begins to be evident, we cannot agree here upon the measures which should be given first priority, surely we should take account of the clearly-expressed priorities of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, whose meeting in New York, I think it worth mentioning once more, was held at the instigation of the Soviet Union.

I shall not read once again the principal terms of resolution DC/225 of 15 June: Mr. Trivedi has already taken us quite ably through them. But I should like to quote a few words from each of the substantive sub-paragraphs of that resolution, 2(b) and (c). They read as follows:

"(b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty to cover underground tests;

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"(c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons ...". (ENDC/149)

Whatever may be said about the intention of the sponsors of this resolution, there can be no doubt, I think, of where the priorities were meant to lie.

Although I do not expect these to be the only subjects for discussion here, I must say that it appears to me, as it appeared to the United States representative strange, to say the very least, that the delegations of the communist countries should now wish to concentrate first upon other collateral measures contained in resolutions that, for very good reasons, were never put to the vote in New York at all.

Perhaps I might turn now for a moment to the fate that the two main concepts contained in the United Nations Disarmament Commission's resolution have suffered at the hands of certain delegations in this Committee. So far as a non-proliferation agreement is concerned -- an agreement to prevent the spread of national nuclear weapons systems -- it has been argued that no such agreement can be contemplated as long as the West persists in its arrangements for the development of nuclear control within the North Atlantic Alliance. There has been no suggestion that even discussion of that subject is possible; simply a blank refusal to consider the matter of non-dissemination as long as the West is engaged in policies that are distasteful to the Soviet Union. That is not the language of international negotiation, nor indeed is it based on a proper regard for the facts.

I feel it necessary once more to set the record straight about the proposals for the Atlantic Nuclear Force now being discussed within the Western Alliance. They do not -- and my Government is determined that they never will -- include any element of dissemination. While I do not expect this argument to be accepted by the Soviet Union in its present mood, I think it must be clear to any reasonable person that the creation of the Atlantic Nuclear Force would not give to West Germany or to any other member of the Western Alliance any more power than it has at present to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the proposal involves the assumption by those non-nuclear Powers of the Western Alliance taking part in the new arrangements of the power to prevent but not to authorize the firing of a nuclear weapon. This is, indeed, a principle which should be

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instantly familiar to the Soviet Union. It is the principle of their old friend the right of veto, as exercised in the Security Council of the United Nations.

On this matter I should like to ask some very clear questions of Mr. Tsarapkin and the other representatives of the communist countries represented here. Do they really object to the possibility of an arrangement within the Western Alliance that will, so far from transferring the control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries, in fact extend the right of veto? Do they really object to the placing of more fingers on the safety-catch of the nuclear weapon? Can they really describe this as dissemination of nuclear weapons, and is this what they mean when they talk of giving West Germany access to those weapons? If so, then I can only say that I entirely fail to understand the logic of their approach.

Indeed, I suspect that the Soviet Union knows quite well that the Atlantic Nuclear Force contains no measure of dissemination but is itself a measure designed to prevent it. I suspect that its fears are of another sort and that they would exist whether an ANF were under discussion in the Western Alliance or not. Indeed, if he will forgive me for doing so, I should like to quote Mr. Lobodycz, the representative of Poland, to show that he himself apparently stops short of asserting that the ANF is disseminatory. He argued:

"Furthermore, the setting up of the Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany would grant a premium to the most aggressive political forces in West Germany for their unyielding position and pressure for access to nuclear weapons. Such a move would encourage these forces and would be a starting-point for their continued claims in the nuclear field." (ENDC/PV.222, p.27)

The fear seems to be, not that the ANF is in itself disseminatory, but that West Germany has nuclear ambitions which the ANF will not satisfy.

So far as Her Majesty's Government is concerned, I can only repeat with all the vigour at my command that we shall never consent to taking part in any nuclear sharing arrangement within the Western Alliance that will involve placing the control of nuclear weapons in the hands of any non-nuclear country, including those of West Germany. And I think I should make it clear that in any case Her Majesty's Government emphatically rejects the accusations that have been made against the West German Government in this context. It is worth pointing out, I

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think, that no other State has gone so far as to renounce the manufacture of atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons on its territory. No other State is subject to the same military threat as is posed by the numerous Warsaw Pact divisions in the Soviet zone of Germany, and the hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles targeted on West Germany from bases in West Russia. It is greatly to the credit of the West German Government that, in the face of such a threat, it has preferred to seek security within the Western Alliance and to take part in the measures of nuclear sharing now proposed within NATO rather than engage in a nuclear weapons programme of its own.

There is one other misconception which I think it would be as well to correct, and that is the idea, also put forward by Mr. Lobodycz, that the setting up of an Allied Atlantic Nuclear Force is incompatible with the aim of reducing nuclear weapons to lower and safer levels. It is of course a familiar and complete fallacy to suggest that the ANF involves the creation of additional nuclear strength. As my Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 16 December 1964:

"If the total Western missile strength were increased, I would further say that we would assume a corresponding reduction in total national missile strengths, so we are not talking about adding to the West's total missile strength." (Official Report, Vol.704, Col.437)

The ANF proposals now being discussed within the Western Alliance, as conceived by the British Government, envisage establishing a control system over existing nuclear delivery systems. There is no incompatibility, therefore, between this and my suggestion, which I repeat, that the nuclear Powers should be thinking seriously about halting and eventually putting into reverse the present nuclear arms race.

If I may, I will now turn for a moment to the other problem mentioned in the resolution of the United Nations Disarmament Commission -- that of an extended nuclear test ban. As we have all heard, the difference between us on this issue at the moment is almost entirely one of the extent to which underground events can be detected and identified by scientific means alone without the necessity for inspection on the spot. I propose not to enter again into the familiar arguments about this, but to ask one simple question. This is based on the speech on 10 August of the representative of Czechoslovakia in which he defended the

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Soviet refusal to agree to technical talks on this subject. After referring to Western requests that the USSR should publish its findings about the system of identification, the Czechoslovak representative went on to say:

"But such demands cannot lead to any results, as the representatives of the West must surely know. In the conditions now prevailing in the world there are reasons why the governments of some States cannot publish certain facts." (ENDC/PV.222, p.42)

If this rather gnostic utterance means anything at all, it means that in the view of the Czechoslovak representative the Soviet Union is unwilling to disclose its information about developments in seismic techniques of identification because it believes that to do so would harm its security. May I ask the representative of the Soviet Union quite categorically whether this is in fact the case, and, if so, what possible harm could be done to the safety of the Soviet Union or its allies by sharing with the West this sort of scientific knowledge? If the Soviet Union can convince the West that on-site inspections are unnecessary we shall have made a great step towards extending the nuclear test ban to cover underground tests. As Mr. Trivedi has hinted, surely this is a prize for which we should be prepared to pay a great price. I cannot believe that sharing information about seismic detection techniques is too great a price for the Soviet Union to pay. But in the light of Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks reported in today's newspapers, possibly he will now concede that seismic instruments alone are not after all enough to provide verification of a ban on underground tests.

I suppose that in a way I was being naive in believing that in a disarmament conference we could hope to concentrate exclusively upon matters of disarmament. But what in fact has happened? I have listened with a growing sense of despair to the speeches of the communist delegations -- or perhaps I should say the speech, since they all appear to be variations on a single predetermined theme. I have sat here wearied and appalled by the cynical way in which this Conference is being turned into a stage from which the communist Powers mount single-minded and tendentious attacks upon the policies of the United States and its allies. I have listened to the familiar jargon about West German revanchism and imperialist aggression. I have heard with great sympathy the resigned but determined attempts of the representative of the United States to set into some historical context

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the accusations that have been made against his Government; and I must say I have admired his restraint as he has listened to the operations of the armed forces of his country being compared, in all apparent seriousness, to the massacre at the Czech village of Lidice.

As I said before in my opening speech at this Conference (ENDC/PV.219, p.14) of course none of the events that are taking place anywhere in the world, and especially in South-East Asia, can be said to be irrelevant to the subject of disarmament. But I do most sincerely make one more attempt to persuade the members of this Committee that this is not the place to enter into these polemics and recriminations. Of course there is a clear and for the moment apparently unbridgeable gulf between the attitude of the communist Powers and that of the West on the way in which the affairs of the world should develop. There is nothing to be gained from rehearsing these differences interminably here at this Conference.

Our task is to approach these problems from one specific direction -- not to attempt to solve all the problems and cure all the evils of the world in one dramatic confrontation. Our task is to try to make the world in which we live -- a world of ideological confusion and conflicting national interests -- a less dangerous place to live in. I think that a great deal of our difficulty in bringing ourselves to concentrate upon the urgent and complicated problems that we face is contained in the fallacy that the world's political problems must all be solved before we can begin to talk seriously about disarmament. If we accept this strange assertion, then we shall never talk about disarmament at all.

In his speech on 10 August the representative of Poland said:

"Disarmament is feasible in a peaceful world. The world full of sounds of military aggression does not favour disarmament." (ENDC/PV.222,p.24)

On 3 August the Soviet representative said:

"Anyone who has eyes to see will easily notice the existence of a close connexion between the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations and the aggressive imperialistic policy of the United States." (ENDC/PV.220, p.6)

Let us examine this proposition a little more closely. What would be our assessment of a surgeon called in to operate on a man critically injured in a motor accident if he reluctantly concluded that he could do nothing at all for the man until he had first ensured that no further accidents could possibly take place? We should, with some justification, regard him as a dangerous lunatic.

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This curious theory seems to indicate that, so long as there is any point in the world at which a clash of ideologies or national interests has exploded into military operations, then we cannot possibly contemplate measures to halt the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons. Even if this proposition contained a grain of truth -- and I do not believe it does -- it would still be a counsel of despair.

And we might note too that the delegations of the communist countries betray a certain lack of consistency even when they advance this argument. Although they suggest that measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, or to extend the nuclear test-ban agreement to cover underground tests, cannot be negotiated so long as the crisis in Vietnam continues, they do not hesitate to suggest that the same crisis makes it far more urgent that we should engage in other measures such as the withdrawal of troops, the liquidation of foreign bases, and agreements to prevent the use, or the first use, of nuclear weapons.

I should like before I conclude today to offer my warm congratulations to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, for her thoughtful and sober remarks. I noted in particular her statement that --

"Sweden is willing in principle to play its part, when a non-dissemination agreement is reached, without raising demands for any such guarantees -- being, as a matter of fact, doubtful as to their desirability." (ENDC/PV.222, p.16)

I also found her exposition of the remaining technical problems raised by a comprehensive test-ban treaty of great interest. I was encouraged by her emphasis on the need for flexibility, and the hope that her speech held out for calm and objective discussion.

I believe that in fact all of us here realize the dangers that face us. It has become quite clear to me in my private talks with members of every delegation represented around this table that we all know that agreement on measures of disarmament and arms control is essential if these dangers are to be averted. Of course it would be naive to suggest that therefore we should be able without further difficulty to reach such an agreement. But I believe that people outside this conference room are beginning to grow tired of our apparent inability to communicate with each other on this subject. There are, as I have said, many

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areas of international relations and political philosophy in which we cannot hope to agree. But there are also, it seems to me, a small number of important areas in which there is some hope, however faint it may be, of useful negotiation. I hope that we can in the short time that is left to us direct our minds to those problems and leave polemics and propaganda to be exchanged, if they must be exchanged, in other places.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): May I be permitted, after the very concrete and interesting statement made by Lord Chalfont, to make a few brief remarks concerning today's meeting and that of last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.222)? During these meetings we have heard some very interesting statements, which have once again confirmed, in particular, the importance of the co-operation of the non-aligned countries at this Conference.

The representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, recalled in his eloquent statement the development of the work on disarmament which preceded this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. He thus confirmed very appropriately the directives by which we should be guided in our work here. He indicated to us very clearly the questions which we should deal with here, by giving priority and a very special urgency to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The same concrete and constructive attitude was taken last Tuesday by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who said at the very outset of her statement that she intended to follow closely resolution 225 (ENDC/149) of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC/PV.222, p.11).

That is a point which emerges very clearly from the statements that have so far been made by the representatives of the non-aligned countries. Their desire to focus the work of the Committee on two subjects of particular importance and urgency -- nuclear tests and non-dissemination -- is fully shared by my delegation and, I believe, by all the Western delegations, as is amply confirmed by the statement which has just been made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont.

I hope that the Eastern delegations will ponder on the positions taken by the delegations of Sweden and India, so that they will avoid in future the tiresome digressions in which they have indulged and so that they, too, will

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concentrate their efforts on these objectives which can be achieved here and which are, I hope, within our reach. It will be possible to achieve them if we do not waste our time and energy by indulging in fruitless polemics or by studying measures which cannot lead to any agreement during the present session.

I should like to thank very sincerely both the delegation of Sweden and the delegation of India for the attention with which they have followed the action taken by the Italian delegation, both here in this Committee and during the discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, with a view to reducing the nuclear danger. I am sincerely grateful to these two delegations for the kind attention which they have given to our efforts. The interest which they have taken in the moratorium proposal put forward by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani, on 29 July 1965 (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18, 19) is for us a valuable source of encouragement. Our thoughts and wishes have been very faithfully interpreted both by the Swedish delegation and by Mr. Trivedi, the leader of the Indian delegation.

If the conclusion of an agreement on non-dissemination should prove impossible within a reasonable time-limit, we should endeavour to achieve here concrete results for the purpose of restricting the nuclear peril by means of direct and independent action on the part of the non-nuclear countries. This action would be aimed not only at applying "self-restrictions" to the non-nuclear countries, but also at encouraging the nuclear countries to restrict and halt the development of their nuclear weapons.

Our action will not be immediate. For the time being, we hope that a joint commitment by the non-nuclear and the nuclear countries will be possible, and we are preparing to explore that possibility thoroughly. But at the appropriate time the promised co-operation of the delegations of Sweden and India will be most valuable, and we shall not fail to take advantage of it in a spirit of sincere friendship, my delegation being prompted by the same aspirations and the same desires as those manifested by those two delegations.

Both today and last Tuesday the delegations of Sweden and India have dealt at length with the problem of the banning of tests. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as Mrs. Myrdal rightly pointed out (ENDC/PV.222, p. 19), had appealed to the delegations of the non-aligned countries (ENDC/PV.219, p. 17) to

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co-operate in solving this serious problem, which is so closely connected with that of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The delegations of Sweden and India have made a very concrete and constructive contribution to the study of this problem. In particular, Mrs. Myrdal has proposed (ENDC/PV.222, pp. 20 et seq.) that an effort of scientific and technical co-operation should be made, and this, in my opinion, would be extremely useful. I do not understand how some delegations here can have any objection to such a suggestion, as though they were afraid of a meeting between men of science on so important a problem as that of nuclear tests. Moreover, would it have been possible to conclude the Moscow Treaty without the help of experts and men of science? It was certainly the same scientists who gave their own governments the assurance that an agreement banning tests in the three environments, without inspection, could be concluded because national detection systems were adequate to guarantee the effective implementation of such a commitment.

Thus, even for the Moscow Treaty, the basis was the data provided by a meeting of minds among the scientists. There was no physical meeting, no joint discussion, but the scientists provided parallel data which induced the governments to take political action. Joint work by scientists of several countries -- non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear -- could certainly, at this stage, clarify the problem and make it possible to find ingenious solutions which at present elude us, and would help us to make progress towards solving the problem of a comprehensive ban on tests.

The Swedish delegation also offered to consider the establishment of an advanced seismic station on Swedish soil for the purpose of detecting and identifying seismic phenomena. This is a question which could be usefully explored by the experts. One could ascertain whether, and in what way, stations situated on the territories of non-aligned countries could contribute towards solving the problem of the safeguards which would have to be included in a test-ban treaty.

Although Italy is not a nuclear country in the military sense of the term, and does not wish to become one, we have nevertheless excellent nuclear scientists and seismologists. We should be happy if they could, as soon as possible, set about working with scientists of other countries, as suggested by the Swedish delegation, in order to try to find with them a sound and equitable solution to the problem of nuclear tests.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 223rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Carlo Lukanov, the representative of Bulgaria.

Statements were made by the representatives of India, the United Kingdom and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 17 August 1965 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.